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Abstract
The wave of privatization in the 1980s and 1990s increased productivity
of many previously state owned enterprises (SOEs). However, governments
often do not have sufficient support to privatize SOEs. We provide evidence
that threatening privatization and market competition (entry of new firms)
can increase the productivity of SOEs, even though privatization and entry of
new firms does not occur. We study productivity at Brazil’s state-owned oil
company Petrobras. After it lost its legal monopoly Petrobras’s total factor
productivity increased sharply. These large gains occurred despite the fact that
Petrobras faced no immediate de facto competition. The threat of competition
and privatization was sufficient to generate large productivity gains. These
findings suggest that changing the competitive environment can be a powerful
force for improving productivity at state-owned firms.
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1 Introduction
There is a great deal of evidence that private firms perform better than public ones.
The wave of privatization of the 1980s and 1990s led to higher productivity at a num-
ber of previously state-owned enterprises (SOEs). (See Megginson and Netter [28]
for a survey.)
However, governments are often politically constrained from privatizing. While
some governments would like to privatize these firms, they cannot. Privatization
often does not have public support and those who benefit from state ownership may
able to block it. Some high profile privatizations, such as those in Russia, were done
in a way that many people perceived as only benefiting politically connected elites.
People in countries with a colonial history are often leery of privatization since it
risks placing public assets in the hands of foreigners, thought of by many as neo-
colonialism. Clear majorities of the population in many Latin American countries
do not think privatization is beneficial and its popularity has been falling over time
(McKenzie and Mookherjee [27]).
Are SOEs doomed to poor performance in cases where privatization is not politi-
cally feasible? In this paper, we show that governments can improve the performance
of SOEs even without privatization. We study a case where the threat of market
competition and privatization increased productivity and improved the performance
of a SOE, even though privatization and entry of new firms did not occur during the
period we examine.
In 1995, Brazil ended the legal monopoly rights of its state-owned oil company,
Petrobras, over production, refining, import and export of oil. Petrobras was not
privatized or broken up and the government claims that there are no plans to do
so. In fact, to get the Brazilian Congress to end monopoly rights of Petrobras
the government formally agree that privatization from then on could only be made
with the approval of Congress. We evaluate the productivity performance of the
company’s oil extraction division before and after the loss of monopoly and the
change of the environment.
The main finding is the reform led to a significant increase in Petrobras’s produc-
tivity growth. Between 1976 and 1994 labor productivity grew at an annual average
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of 4.7 percent whereas between 1995 and 2001 it grew at an annual average of 14.6
percent. Not only did growth triple, the sources of the growth changed. Labor pro-
ductivity growth prior to 1995 was due to capital accumulation and materials use
with little TFP growth. Beginning in 1995 TFP grew rapidly, accounting for almost
all the increase in the labor productivity growth rate.
To accomplish these results, Petrobras slashed its use of inputs while maintaining
output growth. It also began to shift its portfolio of oil wells to more productive
regions and changed its corporate structure. The speed with which the changes
were implemented indicate that they were feasible prior to reform (physically, if not
politically).
What makes this case particularly compelling is that labor productivity growth
immediately doubled despite the fact that the reform resulted in no immediate
changes in Petrobras’s market or ownership. In the period we examine, no other
firms entered the market and no competing imports were allowed. The firm was not
been privatized and has not been in the 15 years since the reform. Petrobras main-
tains a dominant position, still extracting 97 percent of Brazil’s oil. Its advantages as
a large incumbent made it difficult for competitors to enter the market. The changes
brought about by the reform were sufficient to generate significant productivity gains.
The intuition for these changes in the performance of Petrobras is the following.
Petrobras was a monopolist and competing imports were prohibited (only Petrobras
could import oil). Shielded from competitors, Petrobras was not forced to minimize
costs. Many of the non-economic goals that it pursued, such as increasing employ-
ment, directly reduced productivity. Petrobras’s production cost was higher even
when it used the best technology available.
After the reform, Petrobras knew that it would lose its monopoly over the Brazil-
ian market. Facing the prospect of competing against lower cost producers, Petro-
bras’s managers had an incentive to get rid of non-economic goals, reducing costs
even before the changes were implemented1. Had Petrobras continued to pursue
non-economic goals, it faced losing significant market share. Petrobras needed to
1There is a literature suggesting that competition over a field (that is, more than one company
exploring the same field at the same time) can generate inefficient allocation (Libecap and Wig-
gins [26]). As shown below, this did not happen in the Brazilian oil industry. By competition we
mean here more than one company exploring different oil fields in Brazil at the same time.
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reduce its costs to avoid losing its dominant position in the market.
The prospect of foreign firms in the market also constrained the government.
Knowing that lower cost firms would be entering, it could not ask Petrobras to
pursue non-economic goals without inducing losses that the government would have
to cover. It also helped commit future governments to maintain the open markets
by making a return to a monopoly more costly. Reclosing the market would require
expropriating Petrobras’s foreign competitors, risking international retaliation, or
buying them out.
The reform also increased the threat of privatization. The constitutional change
lowered the institutional barriers to privatization. The legal requirement was reduced
from a Congressional supermajority to a simple majority. It was also a clear sign that
the government had changed his objectives. Since its creation, Petrobras’s monopoly
rights had only been expanded. (We will discuss the history of Petrobras below).
The reform was the first time that Petrobras’s legal monopoly had been raised in
Congress. Therefore, the constitutional change pursued by the government and ac-
cepted by Congress was a clear sign that the government’s attitude had changed.
In addition, new producers in the Brazilian market would provide a performance
benchmark. If other companies operating in Brazil’s oil market were successful while
Petrobras was not, it would provide the government with a rationale for privatizing
Petrobras.
These results have some policy implications. When privatization is not politically
viable, increasing competition in the markets of state-owned firms can provide an
avenue for improving performance. Also, indicators of market outcomes can be poor
proxies of market competitiveness. The prospect of competition resulted in major
changes in Petrobras’s management strategy and productivity. However, commonly
used market outcome proxies such as concentration indices changed very little with
the reform. As a proxy for competition, they would have missed a important shift
in the competitive environment.
Our findings are in line with that of Goolsbee and Syverson [19] and Bartel and
Harrison [3]. The first shows that the threat of entry in the U.S. airline industry
led to price cuts by incumbents before the entry occurred. The second provides evi-
dence from Indonesia that the competitive environment is an important determinant
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of productivity, regardless of ownership. Our findings are also consistent with con-
testable markets theory, which argues that a monopolist’s behavior is affected by the
threat of new entrants, not just actual entrants (Tirole [37]). Similar to Bresnahan
and Reiss [5], adding an entrant to a market with few incumbents has a large effect.
Though only one company entered the oil extraction market in the first ten years of
the reform, the productivity growth rate more than doubled.
Our paper is part of a growing literature examining the productivity effects of
discrete changes in competitive pressure. Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz [15] and
Schmitz [21] find that productivity increased sharply in response to increased com-
petitive pressure in the 1980s. Schmitz and Teixeira [22] find that private firms’
productivity increased when public firms in the Brazilian iron ore industry were pri-
vatized. Cole, et al. [11] examine a number of these studies for Latin America. The
closest work to ours is Garcia, Knight and Tilton’s [16, 17] study of Chilean copper
mining. Industry labor productivity increased after other firms were allowed to com-
pete with the state-owned monopoly Codelco. In contrast to our findings, most of
the increase came from high productivity entrants rather than improved productivity
at Codelco.
It is closely related to the “barriers to riches” literature. Parente and Prescott [31]
build a model where a monopolist sets price above marginal cost and does not use
the most productive technology. Our empirical results match their theoretical pre-
dictions. After the end of monopoly rights of Petrobras, output and technological
progress (as measured by TFP growth) increased sharply.
The causes of the post-reform productivity gains are similar to those found in Ol-
ley and Pakes [29]. They study the effects of deregulation and entry on productivity
at the plant level in the U.S. telecommunication industry. They find that productiv-
ity increased mainly due to reallocation of inputs (capital) toward more productive
plants. Productivity growth increased in a similar way at Petrobras, as it shifted
production to more productive wells after the loss of its monopoly.
Laitner [24] separates the costs of imperfect competition in two parts: a static
and dynamic effect. The static effect is the well-known deadweight loss caused by
setting price above marginal cost (Harberger Triangles). The dynamic effect is due
to underinvestment, reducing the capital stock and production. While Petrobras’s
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production grew rapidly after the reform, to the point that Brazil is a zero net im-
porter of oil, investment did not. Production was increased by using capital and other
inputs more efficiently. In fact, it was during the monopoly period that Petrobras
invested heavily, due in part to a national policy designed to encourage investment
(Bugarin et al [9]).
Our work is largely consistent with the literature on the effects of competition.
However, in contrast to much of this work, we study a public company. We find that
public companies react to competition in the same ways as private ones. However,
the nature of the inefficiency of monopoly may be different, since public firms may
pursue political goals that privately held companies do not.
2 Petrobras and the Brazilian Oil Industry
Petrobras is an integrated state-owned oil company that extracts, imports and ex-
ports, and refines crude oil and distributes gasoline2. It is a major player in the
world oil industry and was ranked 125th in the 2005 Global Fortune 500. It is also
very important in Brazil. Its sales are 6 percent of Brazil’s GDP.
While its sheer size makes it economically important in Brazil, Petrobras is also
politically important. It is one of the “Crown Jewels,” a set of politically sensitive
state-owned companies that figure prominently in the nationalist movement. Taxes
on oil extraction are an important source of revenue for Federal, state, and city
governments. There are also indirect benefits. It employs skilled, high-wage workers
and is a source of local supply contracts.
Petrobras was created in 1954 and given a monopoly over oil exploration, ex-
traction and refining. (Existing private refining companies were allowed to continue
operating but could not expand.) This policy was part of a larger import substitution
policy to develop the industrial sector (Kingstone [23]).
From its creation until the 1990s, Petrobras’s control of the Brazilian oil market
steadily increased.3 The monopoly power of Petrobras was extended to the import
2The government holds a majority of the voting stock. Non-voting shares and a minority of
voting shares have been held by the public since the creation of Petrobras.
3See Campos [10] and Barreto [2].
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and export of oil in the 1963. Between the creation of Petrobras and 1970s, domestic
prices were essentially equal to the international price plus a Federal tax. In an
attempt to shield the domestic economy from the oil shocks, domestic prices became
disconnected from international prices in 1977 and based on a measure of domestic
production cost. In 1988, Petrobras’s monopoly rights were guaranteed in the new
Brazilian constitution.
The policy to remove the monopoly originated with President Fernando Hen-
rique Cardoso. The first time that he publicly mentioned his intention of ending
Petrobras’s monopoly rights was in December of 1993 while he was still the Finance
Minister (Prado [33, page 178]). He was elected with a majority in the first round
of presidential voting in October 1994 and took office in January 1995. The election
also provided him with strong legislative support, which his reformist predecessors
did not have. Having strong legislative support was important for the reform since
changing the constitution requires a supermajority vote in the Congress. In February
1995, he sent the amendment to the Congress eliminating Petrobras’s monopoly.
Congressional resistance to the reform was strong. Members from both the left
and right opposed it on ideological grounds; the left was opposed to private in-
volvement and the right opposed weakening a nationalist symbol. The reform also
threatened patronage opportunities. The reform likely would have failed without a
strike by Petrobras’s employees that generated a shortage of natural gas, which is
used widely for cooking. Public opinion turned sharply against the strikers, which
coupled with his personal popularity as the architect of currency stabilizing Real
Plan, allowed Cardoso to push the reform through the Congress. Cardoso’s congres-
sional allies extracted a concession in the form of a clause prohibiting privatization
in the law regulating the oil sector4. (This Petroleum Law was approved in 1997, as
seen below). To end the monopoly, Cardoso had to give up the idea of privatizing
Petrobras (Kingstone [23]).
The amendment was approved in November 1995. The Federal government re-
tained the ownership of hydrocarbon reserves but opened the sector to private firms,
ending 40 years of monopoly. Below we rgue that the reform began in 1995 since
only after the election of president and the congress in October of 1994 Petrobras’s
4The law requires that at least 51 percent of the voting shares be held by the Federal government.
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managers would have seen Cardoso’s likely ability to pass reform upon his election
in that year.
Market opening was phased in. The amendment called for new legislation reg-
ulating the oil market. This law, called the Petroleum Law, was approved by the
Congress in August 1997. It created the National Petroleum Agency (ANP hence-
forth), which took over regulation of the oil market from Petrobras. The Petroleum
Law set out the process of liberalization for all sectors related to production of oil
products. In this paper, we focus on the extraction sector. (For a description of the
deregulation of other sectors, see Serour [36]).
The Petroleum Law allowed Petrobras to keep its rights of extraction of oil in
areas where it could prove that it had done investment. In August 1998, Petrobras
signed 397 contracts with ANP, 282 of which covered areas already under develop-
ment. These contracts, called “Round Zero,” gave the rights for 450 thousand square
kilometers to Petrobras without payment. After that, new areas for exploration were
offered in auctions where any company from any country could participate. By 2003,
41 companies, besides Petrobras, had bought some areas. In that year, Shell was the
first private company to produce oil in Brazil, though Petrobras’s share of Brazilian
production is still almost 100 percent.
In 2001, exports and imports of oil and its derivatives were opened to companies
besides Petrobras (through its subsidiary Transpetro).
In what follows, we date the beginning of the reform in the oil industry as 1995.
Even though the change in Petrobras’s monopoly status occurred at the end of 1995,
as noted above, discussion of the policy change began earlier. When dating the
beginning of a reform, the date of the legal change may not be the most relevant date.
Managers in the reformed industry may have anticipated the reform and introduced
changes prior to the reform becoming official5. For example, in a study of the impact
of privatization in the Brazilian iron ore sector, Schmitz and Teixeira [22] argue that
the reform began in 1990, when a new President was elected promising to privatize
5We would date the beginning of the reform as the election of Cardoso and his congressional
allies in October 1994 if we had monthly data. We designate 1994 as a non-reform year since we only
have annual data. The election occurred late in the year and any changes Petrobras’s management
made would take time to take effect. We test the robustness of our results to including 1994 as a
reform year below.
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and deregulate the economy, rather than the official announcement in 1995.
3 Production Process in the Oil Industry
This paper examines oil and gas extraction productivity. This section discusses
the techniques employed to extract oil and gas from the soil and preparing it for
refining, with particular attention to the attributes of wells that affect extraction
productivity.6
Once a field with oil and gas is discovered, the first step is to install the wells:
holes where pipes are inserted to extract oil and gas from the rock. Recent advances
in satellite seismic imaging have improved exploration and the siting of wells. In
the 1990s, seismic imaging shifted from two to three dimensional geological images.
These techniques are available in the international market and any company in the
sector can use it.
Every well produces both oil and natural gas simultaneously.7 Extraction may
or may not use energy. Some wells have natural pressure that forces oil out without
additional inputs. Other wells do not have enough natural pressure, so it must be
built up artificially. This can be done by either pumping water into the reservoir or
compressing gas into the well.8 Adding pressure requires energy which comes from
the gas produced by the wells themselves, reducing net output. The consumption of
gas can reach 30 percent of the total produced by a well.
The existence of natural pressure in the well is not related to any geographic
characteristics of the field or the well. Both deep sea and land based wells may or
may not have natural pressure. For example, wells in the Middle East have natural
pressure, making it a low cost producer.
Natural pressure is related to the age of the well since removing oil from a field
reduces its pressure. It is possible to reduce the amount of energy spent to produce oil
6This section draws heavily on discussions with Petrobras engineers Sergio Barros da Cunha,
Demetrius Casteloes, and Marcelo Duque.
7Generally the separation of oil from gas is automatically done through the change of pressure.
That is, inside the field there is high pressure. Once the oil and gas comes to the surface, the
reduced pressure allows an automatic separation. See Worley and Laurence [38] and Rondeon [35].
8See Bennion et al [4] and Patton [32].
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and gas by shifting production to new wells, even when the new wells are much bigger
than the old ones. As discussed below, this happened in the Brazil when Petrobras
abandoned older, smaller wells in the states of Alagoas, Sergipe, and Bahia and
concentrated its production in the state of Rio de Janeiro.
The oil and gas extracted from wells comes mixed with water which must be
separated out. The oil and gas are separated from water using chemicals. The
amount of chemicals required may not increase in the same proportion to the liquid
extracted from the well. Chemical use depends on the temperature of the liquid once
it has reached the platform, with colder liquid using more chemicals.
Larger and newer wells may use fewer chemical inputs. First, the amount of water
coming out of a well together with oil depends on the age of the well. The older the
well, the more water it produces. Second, equipment specialized in the separation
of oil from water can be attached to a platform. It uses gas to produce energy
that is use to separate oil from water through a electrostatic treater9. This reduces
transportation costs, since less water is transported to the refinery. This technology
is only economical for wells that produce a high daily volume. This technology is
used in Rio, where wells are large, but is rare in the states where wells were closed.
We conclude that a shift to newer and larger wells used in production likely re-
duced materials usage per well. Newer wells tend to have higher pressure, so they
consume less energy than older wells, and produce less water, so they use fewer chem-
icals inputs. The move to larger and newer wells also allowed the use of separating
technology based in gas that reduces chemical use and reduce transportation cost.
4 Productivity at Petrobras
In this section, we analyze Petrobras’s domestic oil extraction unit’s labor productiv-
ity and TFP performance in response to the loss of its legal monopoly. We argue that
the end of Petrobras’s monopoly and the threat of new competitors had an impact on
its productivity performance. We compute Petrobras’s TFP using a Cobb-Douglas
production function given by
9See Cummings and Engelman [12] and Bromley, Gaffney and Jackson [6].
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Yt = AtK
θ
tM
α
t N
(1−θ−α)
t (1)
where Kt is the aggregate capital stock, Mt is the amount of material, Nt is the
number of employees, θ is the capital share, α is the labor share and At is TFP . We
first discuss the construction of the data series, followed by the choice of factor share
values.
The data are drawn from the ANP and the balance sheets of Petrobras. Output Yt
is the total physical quantity of oil produced. Natural gas produced, a joint product
of oil, is converted into oil equivalents as described in the Appendix. Labor input Nt
is the number of exploration and production employees for each year, adjusted for
contracting out as described in the Appendix. These data begin in 1976.
The capital stock is calculated using perpetual inventory on capital expendi-
tures.10 Data extends back to the establishment of Petrobras, so we directly observe
the initial stock. (Further details are available in the Appendix). Capital expendi-
ture measured in the Brazilian currency was converted into U.S. Dollars using the
December monthly exchange rate and deflated by the U.S. oil and gas equipment
price index.
We did not have data for Petrobras’s material use so we use wells in production
as a proxy. This assumes average material use per well is constant over the period
considered. The robustness of the results to this assumption and those used to
construct the capital series are discussed below.
We now turn to the choice of factor share values. Petrobras’s average labor share
in the period 1976 and 2001 is 0.2. Since we do not have data on Petrobras’s materials
expenditures, we cannot calculate the capital and materials shares directly. Instead,
we use U.S. data. Labor share in Brazil is same as that of the United States, which
10Our measure of capital includes capital formation in two sectors - well exploration and devel-
opment - but we do not include development as part of our output. Well development is fairly
constant aside from a spike in the years 1979 to 1983. This should not affect our main results
although our estimate of TFP may be biased downward during the early 1980s. The data cannot
be extended beyond 2001 since the Exploration and Production unit was consolidated with other
units in 2002, making the data non-comparable.
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Figure 1: Total Factor Productivity of Petrobras and Brazil, 1976-2001
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is an indicator that factor shares are similar in the two countries. We use a capital
share of 0.45 and material share of 0.35 11.
Using equation 1 and the Brazilian data we computed Petrobras TFP shown in
Figure 1. (Figure 1 also shows aggregate Brazilian TFP, which will be discussed
below.) During the time that Petrobras was a legal monopolist, there is very little
sustained growth in TFP . There is a deep and abrupt fall in TFP in the second half
of the 1970s with a recovery in the early 1980s. From 1984 until 1994, TFP shows
no sustained gains. On the other hand, during the reform era from 1995 until 2001
TFP almost doubled, growing 95 percent.
This calculation allows us to decompose the sources of growth of labor produc-
tivity (henceforth productivity). Dividing Equation 1 by Nt, then taking logs yields:
11We use the KLEM data set for Oil and Gas Extraction (Industry Group 4) described in Jor-
genson and Stiroh [20]. See the Appendix for details on the data.
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Table 1 reports a growth accounting for the pre- and post-reform periods. The
growth rate of productivity more than tripled after the end of monopoly. The sources
of growth in the two subperiods also changed. In the first subperiod, productivity
grew almost completely due to an increases in K/N andM/N while TFP was nearly
constant. In the second, TFP became the major source of growth.
Table 1 - Growth Accounting of Petrobras’s Labor Productivity (%)
Period change in Y/N due to TFP due to K/N due to M/N
1977-1994 4.7 0.3 2.1 2.2
1995-2001 14.6 9.6 2.7 2.3
This result is similar to the the findings of Bugarin, et al. [8] for the aggregate
Brazilian economy. They find that the government encouraged capital accumulation
to keep the economy growing after the oil shocks of the 1970s, despite the lack of
technological progress. The government subsidized private companies and had SOEs,
like Petrobras, increase investment.
We now examine the assumptions used in the construction of the capital and
materials series. We find that they do not significantly impact our results.
There are a number of difficulties that could lead to the mismeasurement of cap-
ital. First, Brazil’s history of very high inflation rates complicates the measurement
of capital. Since the data reported on an annual basis, the same nominal expendi-
ture will buy much less real capital if it occurs in December rather than January.
Brazilian accounting rules required indexation of financial reports during the high
inflation years, which mitigates this problem.
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High inflation also led to rapid depreciation of the Brazilian currency, which
affects the conversion to dollars. Using the December exchange rate will tend to
underestimate the real capital stock when inflation is high. The Brazilian currency
was pegged to the dollar. The peg was periodically adjusted (daily during hyper-
inflation), depreciating the Brazilian currency. Therefore, the currency would be at
its most depreciated level at the end of the year. Capital expenditures are converted
using the exchange rate when the Brazilian currency buys the fewest dollars during
the year, which will tend to understate investment. In turn, TFP will tend to be
biased upward. This systematic bias is not present in low inflation years. This factor
will lead us to understate the impact of the reform on TFP growth. Since the oil
sector reform occurred after high inflation ended in Brazil (the Real Plan that ending
high inflation was implemented in July 1994), the upward bias will only be present
before the reform.
We use the U.S. oil equipment price index to deflate investment, which raises
the concern that it may not reflect price changes in Brazil. Overall capital price
movements are similar in the two countries. The aggregate price of equipment relative
to the GDP deflator have similar declines in the United States and Brazil from 1976
to 2001. However, U.S. oil equipment prices do not have the same behavior as U.S.
aggregate capital prices, so the aggregate price index may not be appropriate. We
use the U.S. oil equipment index because it is specific to the oil industry and there
is no corresponding Brazilian index. In any case, the results are not sensitive to
the selection of deflator. The results are not significantly altered if the Brazilian
aggregate equipment price index is used as a deflator.
Another issue is that the relative price of structures in Brazil nearly doubled in the
mid-1980s (Bugarin, et al. [7]). This mismeasurement would also tend to overstate
TFP growth since real investment in structures would be understated after the mid-
1980s. However, the quantitative impact is likely to be tiny. Structures make up
very little of Petrobras’s capital, less than 2 percent of the value of net property,
plant and equipment in 2005.
Turning to the materials series, the constant materials use per producing well
appears to be a reasonable assumption. Examining U.S. data, we compare TFP
using real materials (from Jorgenson and Stiroh [20]) with TFP using the producing
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Figure 2: Alternative U.S. TFP Measures, 1976-2001
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wells proxy. As can be seen from Figure 2, the two estimates are very similar after
1984. The divergence prior to the mid-1980s can be explained by an increase in well
development during the oil crisis years. This industry does not just produce oil and
gas products, but is also engaged in exploration, drilling and equipping oil and gas
wells. A substantial share of materials use is for well development12. U.S. materials
per producing well are relatively stable except for a spike from 1978 to 1984, which
coincides with a spike of the same magnitude in well development.
Brazilian material use per producing well may have fallen during the 1990s. As
discussed above, material usage is largely driven by well attributes and Petrobras
shifted production to newer and larger wells that tend to use fewer material inputs.
If this is the case, our measure of TFP is biased downward since we overestimate
12The largest categories of expenditures in the U.S. Census of Mineral Industries are “Purchased
machinery installed” and “Steel mill shapes and forms.”
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material input.
Figure 3: Petrobras TFP with Materials Proportional to Output and Wells, 1976-
2001
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On the other hand, if material used per well increased, we overestimate TFP
growth. However, it is unlikely that our results would be overturned. Material usage
per well would have to have increased by a factor of nearly 7 to account for the
post-reform increase in productivity. TFP (A in Equation 1) grew by a factor of
1.95. Given an input share of 0.35, material usage per well would need to increase
by a factor of 6.74 (1.95 = (6.74)0.35). Petrobras engineers we spoke with did not
believe that such an enormous increase in materials use occurred.
As an additional robustness check, we calculated TFP assuming that growth
rate of material use was the same as that of output13. This assumption implies that
13We set Mt = ζYt, for some ζ > 0, which gives At =
Y
(1−α)
t
ζαKθtN
(1−θ−α)
t
. Note that ζα cancels out
when TFP is normalized to an index, so the calculation is not affected by the value of ζ.
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material use per well increased after the reform since output per well increased. As
can be seen from Figure 3, the path of TFP is largely unchanged and continues to
show an enormous increase after the reform.
5 Sources of Productivity Growth
Since TFP growth increased so dramatically, it is natural to ask what the sources of
that growth were. In this section, we argue that TFP accelerated due to the reform
that brought the threat of competition and privatization after 1995. Though the
increase in TFP coincides with the policy change (Figure 1), it could have resulted
from some other unrelated sources. We first show that the increase did not result from
a number of plausible candidates: improvements in the aggregate Brazilian economy,
technological progress in oil extraction and maturation of previous investments. We
then show that inputs were used inefficiently prior to the policy change. With the
loss of its monopoly, Petrobras quickly reduced its use of inputs while continuing to
expand output. (Output grew at similar rates before and after the policy change).
The company reorganized its structure in an effort to appeal to outside investors.
The evidence is consistent with non-economic goals becoming less important relative
to the economic goal of improving efficiency.
5.1 Ruling Out Potential Candidates
One potential source of the improvement in productivity is the expansion of the
Brazilian economy in the 1990s. It began recovering from its depression of the 1980s
when many reforms such trade liberalization, currency stabilization, deregulation,
and privatization took place. After these reforms, Brazilian labor productivity and
TFP began growing (Bugarin, et al. [9]). This raises the possibility that it was the
aggregate environment that caused the increase in productivity at Petrobras.
The evidence is not consistent with this explanation. We computed the TFP
of Brazil using the methodology used in Bugarin et al [9]. Returning to Figure 1,
TFP for Brazil and Petrobras have very different patterns14. Brazilian TFP started
14Brazil’s TFP is calculated using a value added measure while Petrobras’s uses a gross output
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increasing earlier than Petrobras’s. While Petrobras’s TFP shows sustained growth
after 1995, Brazil’s begins to decline after 1998. We conclude that Petrobras’s expe-
rience is not due to the movements of the aggregate Brazilian economy.
It is also possible the increase was the result of significant improvements in oil
extraction technology after 1995. The evidence does not support this explanation.
We compare the Brazilian industry to those of the United States, United Kingdom
and Norway. If technology advanced faster after 1995 the relative productivity should
not change. We would expect the oil industries in other countries to implement the
new technology and experience similar growth in the labor productivity.
Most of Brazil’s oil comes from offshore wells, accounting for over 85 percent of
production in 2004. Norway’s and UK’s oil industries resemble Brazil’s since they
extract oil (exclusively) from deep water wells and began offshore production the
mid-1970s. The United States also extracts some oil from deep water but much
comes from land-based sources. Therefore, the comparison should control for both
general technological change in extraction that would affect all countries and specific
change that would only affect offshore extraction.
We do not have enough data to compute TFP for the Norwegian and UK oil
industries or the U.S. industry beyond 1996, so we examine labor productivity.
Figure 4 plots labor productivity, as measured by oil production per worker (in-
dices set to 100 in 1994), for the four countries. While there are clearly differences
in the year to year movements of productivity, the overall pattern is similar prior
to 1995. Productivity falls in the late 1970s and begins to grow in the 1980s. The
magnitude to the growth from the 1980s to 1994 is similar for all four countries.
After 1995, Brazil begins to strongly outperform the other three.
Another possible candidate to explain Petrobras’s rapid productivity growth since
1995 could be the maturation of previous investments. There is a lag between explo-
ration and production. In our case, Petrobras could have increased its investment in
exploration for new and more productive fields during the 1980s and the increase in
productivity could be due to the start of production in these fields.
Figure 5 plots the number of exploratory wells drilled and real crude oil prices
measure. Data constraints prevent us from calculating a value added measure of Petrobras’s TFP .
We use a capital share of 0.37 for Brazil.
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Figure 4: Oil Extraction Labor Productivity - Brazil, Norway, UK and the United
States (Index 1994=100), 1976-2001
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from 1970 until 2001. Until 1999, the number for the whole industry corresponds to
those drilled by Petrobras. From the late 1980s through the 1990s, there relatively
little exploration activity. The number of wells drilled is strongly correlated with the
oil prices, which were low during this period. Therefore, there is little evidence of
the increase in TFP being caused by previous exploration coming online.
While the 1980s were not a period of heavy exploration, one might be concerned
that fields that were coming online were particularly high quality. The Campos Basin
contains a number of high quality fields and production has shifted to this area. It
does not appear that the quality of these fields is responsible for the increase in
productivity after 1994. The dominance of Campos precedes the increase in produc-
tivity by a decade. By 1985, Campos accounted for over 60 percent of Petrobras’s
oil production and has been slowly increasing its share since then.
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Figure 5: Brazil Wells Exploration and Real Crude Oil Price, 1976-2001
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Finally, the increase in productivity might have been due to one particularly good
field within Campos. We found one potential candidate for such a field in Marlim, a
large field discovered in 1985 that began commercial production in 1994. To measure
the impact of this field, we compared two measures of labor productivity. The first
uses Petrobras’s total oil production as the measure of output. Output in the second
is total oil production excluding Marlim’s production. Both use the same labor
measure, the total employment series used in the TFP calculation since we do not
know how many workers were employed in Marlim. Labor productivity still nearly
doubles, growing 76 percent, between 1995 and 2001 when Marlim’s production is
excluded. (It grows 174 percent with Marlim.) All the difference comes at the end of
the period when Marlim’s production reaches its peak. The two measures grow by
nearly the same rate until after 1998. In fact, productivity growth is higher in 1998
without Marlim (54 percent) than with (49 percent). Therefore, the rapid increase in
20
productivity right after 1994 can not be accounted for by the beginning of Marlim’s
production. Oil production and productivity grow even when Marlim is excluded
while employment falls sharply. This calculation is a very conservative lower bound,
since we are including labor input used in Marlim but excluding its output. Marlim
is a very large field that Petrobras has expended substantial resources developing. At
minimum, labor productivity nearly doubled in less than a decade, so we conclude
that this field is not the reason for increasing productivity.
5.2 Our Explanation: The Reform of 1995
We now turn to our explanation of the increase in productivity. We argue that the
threat of competition and privatization led to a change in management’s priorities.
We show that inputs were used more efficiently with the reform. Overstaffing was
reduced and production was shifted to more productive wells. The inefficient use
of inputs likely reflected non-economic goals such as maximizing employment that
became less important after the reform.
We begin by showing that the increase in Petrobras’s productivity growth rate
during the reform era is statistically significant. We run a difference in differences
regressions using Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States as controls.
We estimate a pooled panel regression on labor productivity growth of the four
countries. The treatment “Reform” is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for
Brazil in the years 1995 to 2001. We correct for country specific autocorrelation and
heteroskedastic errors by using Newey-West standard errors15. The sample period
is 1977 to 2001 (the UK data begins in 1979). The dependent variable, the annual
growth rate of labor productivity, is given by the log difference of labor productivity.
The results are shown in Table 1. Column (1) reports our baseline, the regression
with time dummies. The coefficient of the reform is positive and significant at 1
percent level, a strong result especially considering the relatively short treatment
period.
15We implement these regressions using the “newey2” command in Stata 9. We set the maximum
autocorrelation to 3 years, following the rule of thumb of using the cube root of the number of time
periods T : T
1
3 = 25
1
3 ≈ 3.
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Table 1 - Labor Productivity Panel Regressions
Dependent Variable: growth rate of labor productivity
Equation (1) (2) (3)
Reform 0.1137 0.0843 0.0879
(0.000)∗ (0.047)∗ (0.008)∗
Controls Time, Time, Time,
1995 Treat 1995 Treat 1994 Treat
Country
Obs. 98 98 98
∗ p-value
We did a number of robustness checks. In equation (2), we repeat the estima-
tion of equation (1) but we add country controls. The reform indicator is reduced
somewhat, but is still significant at the 5 percent level.
The results are not sensitive to our dating of the reform’s beginning. Since the
event we mark the beginning of the reform (Cardoso’s election) occurred in late
1994, we set the beginning of the reform in annual data as 1995. However, a small
part of 1994 comes after the reform. In column (3), we add 1994 to the treatment
period. (“Reform” takes the value 1 for Brazil in the years 1994 to 2001.) The
reform indicator remains positive and significant at the 1 percent level. The reform
is associated with an increase in growth labor productivity around 8 percent a year.
Again, we obtain this strong finding despite having a relatively short treatment
period.
As a check that the three countries are reasonable controls, we estimate an other
pooled regression (not reported here) for the years prior to the reform (1978-1994)
with a dummy for Brazil. The Brazil dummy is not significant, which suggests that
Brazil’s oil extraction labor productivity growth process was similar to the other
countries prior to the reform.
Given the small sample size, we were concerned that we could not be rely on
inference based on asymptotic results. We tested the residuals for normality using
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the Skewness-Kurtosis test. It does not reject the null of normality at the 5 percent
level.
To check that the results are not driven by changes in the overall economy, we
rerun the regressions after removing average productivity growth in each country.
Since Brazil has a history of macroeconomic instability and significant changes in
economic policy, the results could be driven aggregate changes in Brazil’s economy.
Table 2 reports the results using the growth rate of the labor productivity in the
oil sector minus the growth rate of GDP per capita (from the Penn World Tables)
as the dependent variable. This approach has the advantage of controlling for the
country specific effects without losing degrees of freedom to country dummies.
Table 2 - Labor Productivity Panel Regressions
Dependent Variable: Difference of growth rate of labor productivity in the oil sector
and aggregate economy
Equation (1) (2)
Reform 0.1447 0.1160
(0.000)∗ (0.001)∗
Controls Time, Time,
1995 Treat 1994 Treat
Obs. 98 98
∗ p-value
The results are robust to the new measure of productivity growth. Column
(1) reports the results of the baseline specification. The reform indicator remains
positive and significant at the 1 percent level. The reform coefficient is robust to
changes in the year which the reform starts. As reported in column (2), adding 1994
to the reform period generates similar results. These results indicate that the reform
increased the annual growth rate of labor productivity 10% above the growth rate
of the labor productivity of the aggregate Brazilian economy.
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How was Petrobras able to increase its productivity so significantly? After the
reform, the company made a number of changes in an effort to become more inter-
nationally competitive. Company managers explicitly state that prior to the reform,
Petrobras pursued a number of non-economic goals such as encouraging Brazilian
economic development by building infrastructure in remote areas and purchasing
domestically produced inputs (2003 Annual Report). During the 1970s, the com-
pany restricted its foreign purchases to conserve the government’s foreign currency
reserves (1977 Annual Report).
Anticipating a loss of market share in Brazil with the loss of monopoly, it changed
its corporate and financial structure so the the company would be able to expand
overseas. A major goal was to be able to raise capital “at a cost that was at least
compatible with that of its competitors” (2003 Annual Report). It issued a minority
of its voting stock as American Depository Receipts on the New York Stock Ex-
change in 2000, which requires the company maintain U.S. accounting, disclosure
and corporate governance standards.16
The data are consistent with this change in priorities. Employment fell rapidly
after the reform, suggesting there was overstaffing before. Figure 6 shows the num-
ber of employees. Employment began declining prior to the loss of monopoly status,
though its rate of decline increased sharply after 1994. This decline was due to
the reforms implemented by the Collor government that took office in 1990, part of
which was an across the board reduction in public employment. These changes re-
duced the number of employees at Petrobras. However, despite this earlier reduction
of employment productivity does not start increasing until after 1994. This suggests
that the earlier reduction of employment was not enough to change Petrobras man-
agers behavior. Only once the end of monopoly was approved by Congress signalling
that competition and privatization were a real threat did Petrobras implement other
changes that increased productivity.
The data are consistent with Petrobras employing more workers than required to
produce its output, either for specific patronage reasons or to increase employment
16This offering was not part of a privatization program. In this offering, the Federal government
reduced its holdings from 82 to 56 percent of voting shares. Recall that it is legally obligated to
hold 51 percent of voting shares.
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Figure 6: Number of Workers (in 10,000s), 1976-2001
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generally. A number of authors have argued that political considerations led to over-
staffing. Some overstaffing was due to patronage. Geddes [18] argues that Petrobras
began to be used for political purposes in the 1960s, while it had been relatively un-
politicized before. Management power was given to the oil workers’ union to garner
political support of the employees. Randall [34] estimates that that the company was
overstaffed by 20 percent. Up to 10 percent of the workforce were political patrons,
hired at the behest of the government. Political pressure also forced the rehiring of
fired employees, so both the replacement and original employees were on the pay-
roll. Petrobras was also expected to assist in economic development which may have
encouraged excess employment in an attempt to build up the Brazilian economy.
Oil wells were also used inefficiently, with low quality wells kept in production
prior to the policy change. Figure 7 shows the number of wells in production. Prior
to 1995, the number of wells increased steadily. In 1995, wells in production decline
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(sharply) for the first time in the period covered.
Figure 7: Number of Wells in Production, 1975-2001
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The decline in wells coincides with a large increase in well productivity. As can
be seen in Figure 8, output per well declines in the period prior to the reform. The
development of the productive Campos field led to an increase in the early 1980s.
However, Petrobras added so many wells in less productive areas that total output
per well fell below its pre-Campos level. After the reform, Petrobras seems to have
removed poor wells from production and concentrated its efforts on the best wells.
Marginal wells may have been developed to spread production and the associated
employment, tax revenue and other advantages of local production over a wider
geographical area.
The geographical distribution of wells does change after the reform, with the
number of wells in less productive areas declining. The number of wells in the States
of Alagoas, Sergipe, and especially Bahia, states with some of the least productive
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Figure 8: Output Per Well in Production
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wells, fell sharply while production has largely shifted to more productive areas. In
1994, wells in Bahia produced an average of 9,300 barrels a year while wells in the
State of Rio de Janeiro produced an average of 402,000 barrels a year. The State
of Rio de Janeiro is where the high quality Campos reserves are located and is a
large source of increased production since the reform. Figure 9 shows the number of
wells in Brazil and the state of Bahia. Prior to the reform, the number of wells in
both were growing at the same rate. After the reform, the number of wells declined
with much of the decline coming in Bahia: In 1995, total wells declined by 509 while
Bahia’s wells declined by 419. Bahia is a politically important state so maintaining
production there may have been politically motivated.
The rapid change in the use of inputs in the absence of major technical change
suggests that the goals of Petrobras’s managers changed with the loss of monopoly
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Figure 9: Number of Wells in Production, Brazil and Bahia 1991-2004
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rights. The evidence is consistent with non-economic goals, such as spreading tax
revenue across a wider base, becoming less important relative to the economic goals
of reducing costs and increasing productivity.
6 Competition and Productivity
The reform brought about a remarkable increase in productivity. What makes it all
the more remarkable was how little competition Petrobras faced over the period we
study. Even though Petrobras lost its de jure monopoly, de facto Petrobras is still
a monopolist17 (Palacios [30] and Lewis [25]). The results show that the threat of
17There are still barriers to entry and the sector is quite risky due to government intervention.
For example, recently the Brazilian government blocked a price increase in the domestic market in
response to the high prices of oil in the international market.
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competition, even absent actual competition, can increase productivity. We discuss
the implications of this finding for studying competition and designing reforms.
Petrobras potentially faces two sources of competition in oil extraction: domestic
production and imports. There was little competition from either source.
Recall that the reform was slowly phased in. The Petroleum Law was not passed
until two years after Amendment 9 was adopted. The Petroleum Law laid out a
process of gradual opening. It took nearly a decade from the proposal to actual
market opening.
There was very little entry into the oil extraction market. Table 3 shows the
number of fields that Petrobras and other companies bought in each round that took
place since 1998. The last column shows that share of all fields purchased over the
period. Petrobras has at least an interest in nearly three quarters of new concessions.
Even though the number of areas bought by other companies has increased, they have
had little success discovering oil. As can be seen in Table 4, it was not until 2003
that a company aside from Petrobras (Shell) extracted oil in Brazil. In the last line
of Table 4 we show the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI) (HHI is the sum of the
square of the market share of all companies in a given industry). It takes values
between zero and one, with higher numbers indicating more concentration in the
industry). The HHI has not changed much since the end of monopoly. According
to Kingstone [23], this has been used as evidence that Petrobras kept all the most
promising areas in Round Zero.
Table 3 - Purchase of Rights of Exploitation 1998-2004
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Measuring Entry – Number of Fields
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Share 98-04 (%)
Petrobras 96 1 0 7 3 85 57 54.5
Petrobras with others 0 6 11 7 5 0 50 17.3
Others 19 5 10 19 13 16 47 28.2
Total 115 12 21 33 21 101 154 100
Source: ANP
There was also very little import penetration. The market was not liberalized
until 2001. Petrobras has enormous advantages as the incumbent that cushion it
from foreign competition. It owns all oil terminal facilities in Brazilian ports, though
competing facilities are currently being built.
Table 4 - Petrobras’s Share of Oil Extraction 2001-2004 (%)
Period 2001 2002 2003 2004
Extraction 100.0 100.0 99.2 96.6
HHI 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.93
Source: Anuario Estatistico (ANP) and Petrobras.
Petrobras dominates most aspects of the Brazilian oil market. (Lewis [25] and
Ellsworth and Gibbs [14]). It controls nearly all the refining market. Table 5 shows
the percentage of Petrobras in the total refining capacity between 1997 and 2003.
Petrobras has 98% of the Brazilian installed capacity to refine oil during the entire
period. The end of the monopoly did not affect Petrobras’s share in the industry18.
Maintaining control of exploration and refining gives Petrobras control of the gasoline
market. There is little international trade in gasoline since it must be formulated
18Since 1954, four private companies have operated in the refining sector. They were allowed to
operate since they were operating prior to the creation of Petrobras (Serour [36])
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to local standards, which prevents taking full advantage of economies of scale in
transportation.
Table 5 - Share of the Installed Refining Capacity 1997-2003 (%)
Period 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Petrobras 98.7 98.7 98.5 98.6 98.6 98.3 98.4
Other Companies 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.6
HHI 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Source: Anuario Estatistico (ANP).
6.1 Policy Implications
The results have a number of policy implications.
First, economists should be cautious when using market shares as a indicator of
competitiveness. Using the HHI, one might conclude that the reform was a failure
since Petrobras did not cede its market share. However, it was successful in increasing
productivity. Studies using market share data will miss threats of competition, which
can have real effects.
Another implication is that if privatization is not possible, reducing barriers to
competition can increase productivity. There are no plans to privatize Petrobras and
it is unlikely to occur in the future (Kingstone [23]). The removal of the monopoly
guarantee alone generated significant political conflict.
The results lend support to the view that the competitive environment is an
important determinant of productivity, regardless of ownership. In fact, many in-
stances when only ownership was changed have not resulted in an improvement in
performance (Bartel and Harrison [3]). When privatization is not politically viable,
increasing competition in the markets of state-owned firms can provide an avenue
for improving performance.
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7 Conclusion
We show that competition can be a strong spur to productivity growth. The threat
of competition alone led to a large and swift increase in Petrobras’s productivity.
The results provide support for the idea that closing off competition in the 1970s
contributed to Brazil’s poor economic performance in the 1980s. Petrobras is a mi-
crocosm of the aggregate Brazilian economy. As documented in Bugarin, et al. [9, 8],
Brazilian TFP began to fall after the government expanded state-owned enterprises
(including Petrobras) and raised trade barriers during the 1970s as a strategy to keep
the economy growing despite the worldwide recession. While from 1968 to 1974 the
economy grew rapidly due to surging TFP growth, after 1974 TFP began to fall.
Bugarin, et al. [9, 8] argue that Brazil’s falling TFP in the 1970s was due to the
closing off of competition. The findings give support to this argument. While the
study of a single industry, even a large one like oil, cannot definitely answer whether
restricting competition reduced TFP , it suggests that this is a fruitful avenue of
inquiry.
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A Data
The main source for Brazilian data is the Oil Report (‘Relato´rio do Petro´leo’) from
Ministry of Mines and Energy.
Oil production – thousands barrels per day:
1. Brazil: Oil Report, several years (1954-1990). Anua´rio Estat´ıstico Brasileiro
do Petro´leo e do Ga´s Natural, Ageˆncia Nacional do Petro´leo, several years
(1990-2003).
2. United States: Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Re-
view, 2001, p. 129.
3. United Kingdom: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2003.
4. Norway: Statistics Norway, Oil and Gas Activity, 4th Quarter 2002, Ta-
bles 23 and 24.
5. World production, includes crude oil, shale oil, oil sands and NGLs (nat-
ural gas liquids - the liquid content of natural gas where this is recovered
separately): BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2002.
Employment – oil and gas extraction, and oil and gas extraction services:
1. Brazil: Oil Report and RAIS. Employment has been adjusted for con-
tracting out. Employment by other firms in the oil extraction industry
are added to Petrobras’s exploration and production employment. Prior
to the reform, all these firms were contractors for Petrobras. Beginning in
the late 1990s when other firms could begin oil exploration, employment
will include employees of some firms that are not Petrobras contractors.
For details about RAIS see De Castro, Gomes and Muendler [13].
2. United States: Production and Service Jobs and Wells Drilled. U.S. De-
partment of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Employment,
Hours, and Earnings (www.bls.gov). Oil and gas production (eeu10131001),
and oil and gas services (eeu10138001).
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3. United Kingdom: Employees extraction of mineral oil and natural gas:
SIC 92 CA 11. Department of Trade and Industry, UK.19
4. Norway: Statistics Norway, Oil and Gas Activity, 4th Quarter 2002, Table
45.
Oil Prices – prices for oil: Dubai, oil spot crude price. U.S. dollars per barrel.
1972-1985: Arabian Light; 1986-2001: Dubai. Sources: Brazilian Oil Report
and BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2002.
Natural Gas Prices – prices for natural gas: U.S. Natural Gas Wellhead Price
(Dollars per Thousand Cubic Feet). Source: Energy Information Administra-
tion, Historical Natural Gas Annual.
Investment – For investment series, in U.S. dollars, we use the number from the
Oil Report (several years). The nominal series is converted to 1994 dollars
by deflated by the producer prices Oil and gas field machinery and equip-
ment manufacturing. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
(pcu333132333132). This series begins in 1965. For 1954 to 1964, we use the
U.S. Consumer Price Index.
Wages – U.S.: Average weekly earnings of production workers, oil and gas extrac-
tion. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (ceu1021100004).
A.1 Capital Stock
We constructed the capital stock of Petrobras using the perpetual inventory method
on investment (x). The law of motion for capital stock is:
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + xt (3)
where k is the capital stock and δ is a constant depreciation rate. We assume a
depreciation rate (δ) of 4% per year. Since we start accumulating investment in
19Thanks to Philip Beckett and Mike Earp, Department of Trade and Industry, UK.
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1954, the year Petrobras was established, the initial capital stock comes from the
data.
A.2 Total Output: Oil and Gas
Typically, petroleum exploration and development yields a joint product: oil and
natural gas. The typical way to aggregate oil and gas output has been to convert
natural gas to ’oil equivalent’ at a fixed ratio based on physical thermal content or
on some thermal value content implied by relative wellhead prices at a given point in
time. There is a major problem with fixed coefficient. Relative values of oil and gas
change over time and this affects the problem of firm (see Aldeman and Watkins [1]).
To adjust our data to this possibility, we transform the amount of gas produced
into oil using the price of gas relative to oil in the U.S. spot market. Data constraints
prevent us from producing country specific series. Though the relative prices can
differ across countries, the variances are very similar. The intuition behind these
procedure is that in equilibrium the marginal rate of transformation of gas in oil is
equal to the relative price. Therefore the total amount of oil produced is given by:
yt = ot +
pgt
pot
gt (4)
Where ot is the production of oil in period t (thousand barrels day), gt is the produc-
tion of gas in period t (million cubic feet day), pot is the price of oil (Dubai – barrel
price), pgt is the price of natural gas (U.S. natural gas wellhead price – dollars per
thousand cubic feet).
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